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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has appellate jurisdiction over formal administrative proceedings of the
Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-613(7),
§ 63G-4-403(1), § 78A-4-103(2)(a), and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
~

Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

Whether the three-year statute of limitations applicable to the Employees' claims
against the Hospital, found in Utah Code section 78B-2-305(4), was tolled under
the equitable discovery rule.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"'The applicability of a statute of limitations and ... the discovery rule are
i>

questions oflaw, which we review for correctness."' Jensen v. Young, 2010 UT 67, il
10, 245 P .3d 731 (quoting Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 2007 UT 25, il 11, 156
P.3d 806 (alteration in original)).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-102(48)(a) (emphasis added):

@

"Service credit" means: (a) the period during which an
employee is employed and compensated by a participating
employer and meets the eligibility requirements for
membership in a system or the Utah Governors' and
Legislators' Retirement Plan, provided that any required
contributions are paid to the [retirement} office; ....

1

Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-202:

(1) (a) Unless excluded under Subsection (2), an employer is a
participating employer and may not withdraw from
participation in this system.
(b) In addition to their participation in this system,
participating employers may provide or participate in any
additional public or private retirement, supplemental or
defined contribution plan, either directly or indirectly, for
their employees.
(2) The following employers may be excluded from participation
in this system:
(a) an employer not initially admitted or included as a
participating employer in this system before January 1, 1982,
if:
(i) the employer elects not to provide or participate in any
type of private or public retirement, supplemental or
defined contribution plan, either directly or indirectly, for
its employees, except for Social Security;

(3) If an employer that may be excluded under Subsection
(2)(a)(i) elects at any time to provide or participate in any
type of public or private retirement, supplemental or defined
contribution plan, either directly or indirectly, except for
Social Security, the employer shall be a participating
employer in this system.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(4):

An action may be brought within three years:
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than
for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except
where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by
the statutes of this state; ....

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Utah Legislature enacted the Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act
("Retirement Act" or "Act"), found in Title 49 of the Utah Code, in order to provide a
comprehensive system of retirement and health insurance benefits to state and local
~

public employees throughout the State of Utah. In order to administer the benefit
programs in a consistent and uniform way, the Legislature created within the Retirement
Act an administrative office-the Utah State Retirement Office, also known as the Utah
Retirement Systems (the "Retirement Office" or "URS"), and a governing body-the
Utah State Retirement Board ("the Retirement Board" or "Board"). See Utah Code Ann.
§§ 49-11-201, -202. The Legislature also included within the Act a mandatory
administrative appeals procedure for "a person" who has "any dispute regarding a
benefit, right, obligation, or employment right under this title." Id. § 49-11-613(l)(c)

Ci

(emphasis added). While the Act's appeals procedure and accompanying Board rules
provide timeframes within which appeals must be brought, the Act does not currently
contain its own statute of limitations for claims arising thereunder. See id.
Respondents Lori Ramsay and Dan Smalling ("the Employees") are employees of
Kane County Hospital, operated by the Kane County Human Resource Special Service
District ("the Hospital"). R. 43, 632. As a special service district, the Hospital was an
"employer" as defined by the Retirement Act at all times relevant to this dispute. See
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-l l-102(38)(b); R. 632. In 1993, the Hospital began offering its
employees a retirement benefit in the form of private 40l(k) accounts. R. 632. The

3

Hospital did not provide public retirement benefits to its employees under the Retirement
Act. R. 423.
URS did not discover that the Hospital was providing a 401 (k) retirement benefit
to its employees until the Hospital submitted to URS a New Group Questionnaire to
explore participation in URS on January 22, 2007. R. 330, 424. Utah Code section 4913-202 requires that every governmental entity in Utah1 that offers a retirement benefit to
its employees shall be a participating employer with URS, as defined by the statute.
Therefore, under Utah law, the Hospital was required to be a participating employer and
pay retirement contributions to URS on behalf of its eligible employees when it began
offering a 40l(k) retirement plan to its employees in 1993. See id. The Hospital disputed
this fact and declined to pay any contributions. R. 424, 633.
URS worked with the Hospital and the Utah Legislature to provide a funding
mechanism to assist the Hospital in meeting its financial obligation under the Act. R.
333. In 2012, the Utah Legislature passed a bill providing grant money to eligible rural
county hospitals to meet unfunded retirement liabilities. R. 333, 368-70. Pursuant to the
bill, the Hospital applied for, and received, a grant of $900,000 from the Utah
Legislature. R. 333. The Legislature also amended the Act in 2009 to allow a rural
county hospital a short window within which to elect to opt-out of participation with
URS. R. 4, 424. The Hospital filed its election of nonparticipation on April 30, 2009. R.
424.

The only exceptions to this rule are listed in Utah Code Ann.§ 49-13-203. Between
1993-2009, the Hospital did not meet any of these exceptions.

1

4

Upon securing this assistance for the Hospital, and in order to timely preserve its
claim against the Hospital, URS brought an action through the Retirement Act's
administrative hearing process to enforce the Hospital's obligations under the Act. R. 125. URS' Notice of Board Action was filed on August 11, 2009, less than three years
ib

from when URS learned of the Hospital's statutory obligation to participate in the URS
retirement systems. R. 1-25.
On December 16, 2009, without engaging in the mandatory administrative appeals
process set up for benefit claims under the Retirement Act, the Employees filed a
Complaint in District Court for funding of the URS retirement benefits to which they
were entitled. R. 43, 47-59. The Employees named as defendants the Hospital, URS,
and two independent financial advisors-John Hancock Life Insurance Company and
Dean Johnson-who assisted the Hospital in setting up the 401(k) plans. R. 44, 47. In

Ci

addition, in March 2010, the Employees sought and were granted permission to intervene
as interested parties in URS' action against the Hospital in the administrative hearing
process. R. 43-45, 98, 222-23. The Employees did not, at that time, bring any of their

@

own claims. R. 43-44. The Employees' amended their Motion to Intervene in 2014 and
attached a Statement of Claim to clarify their claims against the Hospital. R. 519-25. In
the Statement of Claim, the Employees relied on the facts and assertions presented in
URS' Notice of Board Action against the Hospital. R. 523-34. The Employees also
stated that they "seek from [the Hospital] relief' in the form of "an Order that they are
entitled to service credits under the Act ... and for funding from [the Hospital] as a
participating employer under the Act ... based on those service credits ... in addition to
5

the partial defined contribution benefits they were paid from [the Hospital] ...." R. 524.
The Employees did not name URS as a respondent in the action. R. 523-24.
Ultimately, the Employees' district court case was dismissed for failure to exhaust
their administrative remedies, because each of their claims arose under the Retirement
Act and were therefore subject to the administrative hearing process contained therein.

See Ramsay v. Kane County, 2014 UT 5,, 18,322 P.3d 1163. In the meantime, the
administrative action proceeded against the Hospital.
On March 1, 2013, the Hospital filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
against URS, solely regarding the applicability and effect of the relevant statute of
limitations. R. 266-68. For purposes of the Motion only, the parties stipulated and the
Hearing Officer assumed that the Hospital was an employer eligible to participate in URS
at all relevant times. R. 272, 293, 329. The parties did not dispute that the applicable
statute of limitations was three years for a liability created by the statutes of this state
under Utah Code section 78B-2-305(4), R. 275, 335-36, 375, but disagreed as to whether
the statute of limitations was tolled under the equitable discovery rule. R. 27 6-79, 3 3 643, 376-81. The Hearing Officer granted the Hospital's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, holding that URS' claim for retirement contributions was limited by the threeyear statute of limitations to contribution claims that arose between August 11, 2006 and
April 30, 2009. R. 427. URS did not appeal this decision.
In the meantime, the Hospital met with the past and present employees who would
have been eligible for a retirement benefit with URS, and pursuant to statutory authority,
offered a substantial substitute in lieu of the URS retirement benefits. See Utah Code
6
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Ann.§ 49-11-601(6); R. 501, 535, 557. All but six of the employees settled their
potential claims with the Hospital. Id. The Hospital thereafter paid the required
retirement contributions to URS for those six employees, including Ramsay and
Smalling, for the three years between 2006 and 2009. Id. As such, URS filed a Motion
(i)

to Dismiss its Request for Board Action against the Hospital, joined by the Hospital,
because all of its claims against the Hospital had been resolved. R. 498-503, 513-14.
The Hospital then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against the Employees,

@

arguing that their claims were also barred by the applicable statute of limitations, which
was not tolled by the equitable discovery rule. R. 531-44. The Employees opposed the
Hospital's Motion and filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 569-83. Again,
the parties stipulated, and the Hearing Officer accepted for purposes of the Motion only,
that at all times relevant to the dispute, the Hospital was an "employer" as defined by the
(i

Act. R. 537, 632. The Hearing Officer granted summary judgment in favor of the
Hospital, holding that the equitable discovery rule did not toll the applicable three-year
statute of limitations as against the Employees' claims against the Hospital because the
Employees were unable to prove "concealment" or "exceptional circumstances." R. 63738. Given the ruling on the statute of limitations, the Hearing Officer declined to address
the merits of the Employees' Cross Motion. R. 638.
The Retirement Board then issued a Final Order, adopting the Hearing Officer's
previous decisions-Findings of Undisputed Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Partial
Summary Judgment [against URS], Order on [URS'] Motion to Dismiss, and Findings of
Undisputed Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment [against the Employees]
7

as the final board action, and determining "that all claims brought by [URS] and the
Intervenors in this action have been considered and dismissed." R. 640-43.
Within the requisite time period, the Employees appealed the Board's final action
regarding tolling of the three-year statute of limitations applicable to their claims against
the Hospital to this Court. See Intervenors' Notice of Claim.

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

Statement of Stipulated Facts
The following sets forth the parties' Statement of Stipulated Facts relied on in the
Hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment of Intervenors' Claims before the Board:
Intervenors contend that the Hospital, as a special service district,
was an employer as defined under Utah Code Ann.§ 49-1 l-102(23)(a) at
all times relevant to this dispute. The Hospital disputes that contention.
However, for purposes of this Motion only, the parties ask the Hearing
Officer to assume for sake of argument that the Hospital was an eligible
employer under the Retirement Act, and thus able to participate in the State
Retirement System.
With that caveat, the Hospital and Intervenors stipulate to the
following set of facts for purposes of this Motion only.
1.
Kane County Hospital (hereinafter the "Hospital") is a special
service district within the meaning of Utah Code§ 17D-1-101, et seq. The
special service district was created by the Kane County Commission in
1989 to operate the only hospital in Kane County.
2.
Kane County Hospital, as a special service district, was an
employer as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 49-1 l-102(23)(a) at all times
relevant to this dispute.
3.
In 1993, the Hospital began offering a 401(k) retirement plan
to its employees.
4.
Intervenor Lori Ramsay participated in the Hospital's 401(k)
retirement plan from January 1, 1994 through July 20, 2007.

8

5.
Intervenor Daniel Smalling participated in the Hospital's
40l(k) retirement plan from October 7, 1995 through July 22, 2000.
6.
On January 5, 2007, Intervenor Lori Ramsay, an employee of
the Hospital, spoke with Cindy Bon, Accounts Service Manager for the
Utah State Retirement Office ("Retirement Office"), to obtain information
about state retirement benefits. Thereafter, the Retirement Office sent Ms.
Ramsay a letter with the information that Ms. Ramsay requested and a copy
of a Retirement New Group Questionnaire, which Ms. Ramsay provided to
the Hospital. The purpose of the Retirement New Group Questionnaire is
to determine eligibility for participation in the State Retirement System.
7.
On January 22, 2007, the Hospital completed the Retirement
New Group Questionnaire and returned it to the Retirement Office.
8.
On February 12, 2007, the Retirement Office informed the
Hospital that it was eligible for membership in the State Retirement
System. The Hospital declined to make any retrospective retirement
contributions to the State Retirement Systems.
9.
On April 30, 2009, pursuant to legislation passed by the Utah
State Legislature in the 2009 General Legislative Session, the Hospital's
Board of Directors approved a resolution to irrevocably elect
nonparticipation in the State Retirement Systems.
10.
The Hospital has paid all retirement contributions to the
Retirement Office on behalf of the Intervenors for the period of time
between June 2006 and April 30, 2009.
11.
The Retirement Office has granted each of the Intervenors
retirement service credit for the entire time period for which retirement
contributions were received (i.e., June 2006 through April 30, 2009).
R. 560-62.
Clarifications to Employees' Statement of Facts
Employees' Fact #10: The Act establishes a statutory level of funding for any

deferred retirement benefits established by a governmental entity such as KCH. Br. of
Appellants, at 12.
9

Board's Response: The Act establishes statutory retirement benefits available to
employees of participating government employers in the State of Utah in the form of
defined benefit (pension) programs and defined contribution (i.e. 40l(k) or 457) plans.
See Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-101 et seq. The Act does not dictate what level of funding
must apply to other retirement benefits offered by a governmental entity, but simply
mandates that if another retirement benefit is offered, the statutory benefits set forth in
Title 49 must also be offered. See id. § 49-13-202(4).
Employees' Fact #18: During the 2009 General Legislative Session, legislation
was passed to allow state employers to opt out of the System. Based on this change to
the Act, in April of 2009, KCH elected not to participate in the System. Br. of
Appellants, at 13.
Board's Response: The state legislation passed in 2009 by the Utah Legislature
specifically allowed "an employer that is a hospital created as a special service district to
elect to be excluded from participation in the Public Employees' Contributory Retirement
System and the Public Employees' Noncontributory Retirement System under certain
circumstances." See H.B. 167, 54th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2009), available at
http://le.utah.gov/. . . 2009/bills/ static/HBO 167 .html; see also Utah Code Ann. § 49-13202(5)(a)(i). Under the Act, the State and its educational institutions are mandatory
participants in URS. See Utah Code Ann.§ 49-13-201(1).
Statement of Additional Relevant Facts
1. The Retirement Board administers URS, which was created by statute as an
independent state agency pursuant to Utah Code section 49-11-201(2). URS

10

administers the state retirement systems, plans and programs pursuant to the
statutory requirements of Utah Code Title 49, the Retirement Act. See Utah Code
Ann. § 49-l 1-201(1)(b); R. 423.
2.
~

The purpose of the Retirement Act "is to establish: (a) retirement systems ... for
members which provide: ... (iii) benefits for members; (iv) funding on an
actuarially sound basis; (v) contributions; and (vi) economy and efficiency in
public service; and (b) a central administrative office and a board to administer the
various systems, plans, and programs established by the Legislature or the board."
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-103(1).

3.

URS was unaware that the Hospital was providing any kind of retirement benefit to
its employees until URS received the Hospital's completed New Group
Questionnaire.2 R. 330.

ej

4.

In the 2012 General Legislative Session, the Utah Legislature passed HB 512, Rural
County Health Care Special Service District Retirement Grant Program ("Grant
Program"), enacting Utah Code Ann.§ 26-9-5, to create a grant program for
providing state funding assistance to rural county health care special service
districts, such as the Hospital, in meeting a state retirement liability. R. 333, 368.

5.

The Grant Program appropriated $900,000 for grants, which would be made
available, upon application, to any rural county health care special service districts

2

The pa1iies stipulated to this fact for purposes of the Hospital's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment against the Board.
11

that were required to participate in the Utah State Retirement System, and which
owe, as a result, more than $750,000 to the Retirement Office. R. 333, 368-70.
6.

The Hospital applied for and received a grant of $900,000 through the Grant
Program to fund its retirement liability owed to its employees and URS. R. 333.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I.

FOR PURPOSES OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ISSUE, THIS
COURT MUST ASSUME THAT THE HOSPITAL WAS REQUIRED TO
BE A PARTICIPATING EMPLOYER UNDER THE ACT WHEN IT
BEGAN OFFERING ITS EMPLOYEES A RETIREMENT BENEFIT.
For purposes of the Hospital's Motion for Sunnnary Judgment of Intervenors'
Claims, the Hearing Officer correctly assumed, based on the stipulation of the parties,
that the Hospital was an "employer" under the Retirement Act at all times relevant to this

@

dispute, as a special service district of the State of Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 49-11102(23 )(a), (40)(b). This Court is bound by that stipulation. See, e.g., Yeargin, Inc. v.

Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2001 UT 11, iJ 20, 20 P.3d 287 ("A stipulation
of fact filed with and accepted by a court 'acts as an estoppel upon the parties thereto and
is conclusive of all matters necessarily included in the stipulation.' Such a stipulation 'has
all the binding effect of findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the court upon
the evidence."' (Citations omitted.)). To the extent this Court's decision on the equitable
discovery rule requires a determination of the Hospital's underlying liability, the matter

@

should be remanded to the Board's Hearing Officer for a determination.
In the alternative, if not assumed by this Court, under section 49-13-202 of the
Retirement Act, the Hospital was required to become a participating employer as soon as

@

12
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it began offering a 401 (k) retirement benefit to its employees. See Utah Code Ann. § 4913-202(3) ("If an employer that may be excluded under Subsection (2)(a)(i) elects at any
time to provide or participate in any type of public or private retirement, supplemental or
defined contribution plan, either directly or indirectly, except for Social Security, the
employer shall be a participating employer in this system." (Emphasis added.)).
II.

THE EMPLOYEES' CLAIMS ARE SUBJECT TO THE THREE-YEAR
GENERAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNLESS TOLLED UNDER
THE EQUITABLE DISCOVERY RULE.
The Hearing Officer correctly held, and the Board approved, that the three-year
general statute of limitations found in Utah Code section 78B-2-305(4) "for a liability
created by the statutes of this state" applies to the Employees' claims against the
Hospital. R. 634. The only remaining issue is whether or not the equitable discovery
rule tolls the statute of limitations. Although URS argued in favor of tolling with respect

<i

to its claims against the Hospital, it accepted and did not appeal the determination of the
Hearing Officer as approved by the Board. URS did not, and does not, take a position on
tolling of the Employees' claims, with the exception of the following two arguments.
First, no claims exist against URS. URS' Notice of Board Action was dismissed
against the Hospital. R. 529. Further, although the Employees intervened as interested
parties in URS' action against the Hospital, and later amended their Motion to Intervene
to specifically set forth their distinct claims against the Hospital, they never named URS
as a respondent in the administrative action, nor stated a claim against URS. R. 519-20,
523-24. As such, it is only the Hospital's liability that is at issue in this appeal.

13
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Second, the common law equitable discovery rule is the applicable discovery rule,
and the discovery mle found in the Governmental Immunity Act does not apply. The
claims brought by URS and the Employees fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the
Board as arising under the Act. See Ramsay v. Kane County, 2014 UT 5, ,I 18,322 P.3d
1163 ("[W]e conclude that all of Plaintiffs' claims fall within the scope of the Act .... ").

@

Additionally, under Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, when a statute of
limitations does not contain its own discovery rule, the common law equitable discovery
rule is applied. 2005 UT 14, ,I 24, 108 P.3d 741.

III.

REGARDLESS THE APPLICATION OF THE DISCOVERY RULE, NO
SERVICE CREDIT CAN BE AWARDED WITHOUT PAYMENT OF THE
REQUISITE RETIREMENT CONTRIBUTIONS.
Finally, if this Court tolls the statute of limitations to allow service credit for the
Employees prior to 2006, no service credit can be awarded without the requisite
retirement contributions being paid. The term "service credit" is defined in the statute as,
"the period during which an employee ... meets the eligibility requirements for
membership in a system ... provided that any required contributions are paid to the

[retirement} office." Utah Code Ann. § 49-l 1-102(48)(a) (emphasis added); see also id.

§ 49-13-401 (requiring that an employee have service credit in order to receive a
retirement benefit). As a policy matter, to allow service credit without funding would
create a significant actuarial deficit to the Retirement Fund that would be unjustly borne
by the remainder of the participating employers and employees. Thus, URS requests that
if this Court tolls the statute of limitations to award additional service credit to the
Employees, that it also order the requisite retirement contributions be paid to URS.
14

(i)

ARGUMENT

I.

FOR PURPOSES OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ISSUE, THIS
COURT MUST ASSUME THAT THE HOSPITAL WAS AN EMPLOYER
UNDER THE ACT WHEN IT BEGAN OFFERING ITS EMPLOYEES A
RETIREMENT BENEFIT.
For purposes of the Hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment oflntervenors'

Claims, the Hearing Officer correctly assumed, based on the stipulation of the parties,
that under the Retirement Act, the Hospital was an "employer." The parties stipulated,
and the Hearing Officer ruled that "[the] Hospital, as a special service district, was an
employer as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 49-l 1-102(23)(a) at all times relevant to
this dispute." R. 632. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer relied on this stipulation in
@

making his determination. R. 633-34 ("[T]he following conclusions of law assume that
the Hospital was an employer as defined under the Retirement Act."). This Court must
do the same. See, e.g., Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2001
UT 11,120, 20 P.3d 287 ("A stipulation of fact filed with and accepted by a court 'acts
as an estoppel upon the parties thereto and is conclusive of all matters necessarily
included in the stipulation.' Such a stipulation 'has all the binding effect of findings of
fact and conclusions of law made by the court upon the evidence."' (Citations omitted.)).
To the extent that this Court's decision relies upon a determination of the

@

underlying liability, this Court should remand for a determination by the Board's Hearing
Officer. See, e.g., Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
("Unless the record clearly and uncontrovertedly support[s] the trial court's decision, the

@

absence of adequate findings of fact ordinarily requires remand for more detailed findings
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by the trial court." (Citations omitted.)) In the alternative, if this Court does not assume
that the Hospital was an "employer" under the Act, under the clear and mandatory
statutory language, the Hospital was required to participate in a retirement system
administered by URS when it began offering a 401(k) plan to its employees in 1993.
Under the Act, an "employer" is "any department, educational institution, or political
subdivision of the state eligible to participate in a government-sponsored retirement
system under federal law." Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-102(20) (2009). 3 In the Public
Employees' Noncontributory Retirement System, to which the Hospital was subject, a
"participating employer" is defined as "an employer which meets the participation
requirements of Section 49-13-20 I or Section 49-13-202." Id. § 49-13-102(3 ). Section
49-13-201 allows, in addition to the State and its employees, that "An employer, other
than the state and its educational institutions, may participate in this system except that
once an employer elects to participate in this system, that election is irrevocable." Id. §
49-13-201(2). Section 49-13-202 requires, "Unless excluded under Subsection (2), an

employer is a participating employer and may not withdraw from participation in this
system." Id.§ 49-13-202(1)(a) (emphasis added). The relevant exclusion of Subsection
(2) allows exclusion of "an employer not initially admitted or included as a participating
employer in this system prior to January 1, 1982 if: (i) the employer elects not to provide
or participate in any type of private or public retirement, supplemental or defined
contribution plan, either directly or indirectly, for its employees, except for Social

3

All references to the statute are to the 2009 version in effect at the time URS brought its
Notice of Board Action, unless otherwise specified.
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Security; .... " Id. § 49-13-202(2)(a). Thus, an employer who does not offer its
employees any type of private or public retirement benefit may be excluded from being a
participating employer. However, upon electing to provide any type of retirement
benefit, by law it is required to be a participating employer.
The Hospital squarely meets this statutory definition. Though the Hospital has
stipulated to this fact for purposes of its summary judgment motions only, there can be no
meaningful dispute that as a special service district of the State of Utah, the Hospital is a
political subdivision of the state and therefore an "employer" under Title 49. See id. §
49-11-102(23)(a) ('"Employer' means any ... political subdivision of the state eligible to
participate in a.governmental-sponsored retirement system under federal law.");§ 49-11102(40)(b) ('"Political subdivision' includes ... special service districts .... "). It
follows that, unless excluded as permitted by the statute, the Hospital, as an employer, is
®

also a participating employer. See id. § 49-13-202(1)(a) ("Unless excluded under
Subsection (2), an employer is a participating employer ... ."). Prior to 1993, the
Hospital was able to be excluded under Subsection 49-13-202(2) by not providing an
employee retirement benefit, but once the Hospital elected to provide "any type" of
retirement benefit to its employees, which it began providing in 1993, R. 632, the statute
very clearly mandated that it "shall be a participating employer." See id. § 49-13-202(3).
In short, the Act plainly requires that any political subdivision of the state that
offers any type of retirement benefit to its employees also participate with a retirement
system administered by URS. When the Hospital began offering a 40l(k) to its
employees in 1993, its mandatory participation with URS was indisputably triggered.
17

Because the parties stipulated to the Hospital being an employer at all times relevant to
the dispute, the Hearing Officer assumed this fact and legal conclusion to be true for
purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 632, 633-34, and this Court is
therefore bound by the stipulation. See, e.g., Yeargin, Inc., 2001 UT 11, ,r 20. If this
Court determines that the statute of limitations indeed limits the Employees' claims, then
the nearly three years' worth of retirement contributions has already been paid by the
Hospital to URS, and the issue is moot. On the other hand, if this Court determines that
the statute of limitations was tolled under the equitable discovery rule, then the issue of
the Hospital's liability prior to 2006 should be remanded for a determination by the
Board's Hearing Officer.

II.

THE EMPLOYEES' CLAIMS ARE SUBJECT TO THE THREE-YEAR
GENERAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNLESS TOLLED UNDER
THE EQUITABLE DISCOVERY RULE.
The Hearing Officer correctly held, and the Board approved, that the three-year

general statute of limitations as found in Utah Code section 78B-2-305(4) applies to the
Employees' claims against the Hospital. That statute states, "An action may be brought
within three years ... for a liability created by the statutes of this state ...." Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-2-305(4). The pa1iies all appear to be in agreement that this statute of
limitations applies to the Employees' claims. R. 275, 335-36, 375. The remaining issue
disputed by the parties, and the only issue properly on appeal, is whether a discovery rule
would apply to toll the applicable statute of limitations.
As discussed infra, the Hospital was statutorily required to participate with URS
and pay contributions on behalf of its eligible employees upon offering its employees a
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401(k) retirement benefit. See Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-202(3). In line with this
statutory requirement upon employers, it has been URS' practice for many years to
request and collect past contributions from employers without limitation, believing that
any applicable statute of limitations on such claims was tolled under the equitable
discovery rule. R. 332, 348. Consistent with this practice, URS brought its Notice of
Board Action against the Hospital for past contributions due. R. 1-25. The Hospital
subsequently brought a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to limit the claims of URS
based on the applicable statute of limitations, R. 266-81, and URS defended its practice,
arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled under the equitable discovery rule
until URS discovered the Hospital's 401(k) plan. R. 336-43. Nevertheless, the Hearing
Officer ruled, R. 427, and the Board adopted his decision as its order, R. 641, that the
statute of limitations on URS' claims was not tolled under the equitable discovery rule
@

because URS had not proven either "concealment" or "exceptional circumstances" as
required by common law. See Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 108
P.3d 741. Given the clarification by the Hearing Officer regarding the equitable
discovery rule, URS accepted and did not appeal the decision. Accordingly, the issue of
the application of the statute of limitation to URS' claims against the Hospital is not
before this Court on appeal.
Following the Hearing Officer's decision, the Hospital paid the requisite three
years' worth of contributions to URS for all of its eligible employees who did not
otherwise settle with the Hospital, among whom were Ramsay and Smalling. R. 501,
535, 557. As such, upon receipt of the outstanding contribution amounts, URS moved for
19

a dismissal based on its claims having been resolved, R. 498-503, which the Hearing
Officer granted. R. 529.
The Hospital then filed its Motion for Summary Judgment oflntervenors' Claims,
seeking to similarly limit the Employees' claims under the applicable three-year statute of
limitations. R. 534-44. Consistent with his previous opinion, the Hearing Officer ruled
that the Employees' claims against the Hospital were also limited to the three years
preceding the filing of the Notice of Board Action, R. 638, and the Employees appealed.

In making its determination regarding the equitable discovery rule, this Court
should take into account the following arguments.

A.

Because URS' Claims Against the Hospital Were Dismissed, and the
Employees Never Brought a Claim Against URS in the Administrative
Process, All Claims on Appeal Are Against the Hospital, Not URS.

The Employees' claims on appeal are solely against the Hospital, not URS. URS'
claims were specifically dismissed from this action, when its Motion to Dismiss its
Request for Board Action was granted by the Hearing Officer. R. 529. Further, the
Emloyees never named URS as a respondent in the administrative action, nor stated a
claim against URS. 4 R. 519-20, 523-24. As such, it is only the Hospital's liability that is
at issue in this appeal.
Nevertheless, in their opening brief, the Employees seem to be making an
allegation against URS akin to what was alleged in their district court action. Br. of
4

In their Statement of Claim, the Employees request "an Order that they are entitled to
service credits under the Act." R. 524. While URS would be the entity to award the
service credits, the Employees did not state the request as a claim against URS, nor name
URS as a respondent, and the credits are available only upon the requisite funding being
provided by the Hospital.
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Appellants, at 20. Such allegations are unfounded, irrelevant, and not an issue before this
Court. Yet, even if such claims had been brought in the administrative action, URS and
the Board fulfilled their statutory and fiduciary obligations, despite Appellants' attempt to
shift the burden away from themselves and onto URS and the Board. Appellants state
@

that the Board did not inform Ramsay and Smalling of the fact that they had a legal right
to a URS retirement benefit, and that such failure was negligent and a breach of fiduciary
duties. See Br. of Appellants, at 20. Appellants also state that the Board "failed ... to
monitor [the Hospital's] activities in a way that would uncover [the Hospital's]
noncompliance is a timely way." Id. at 21. But there is nothing in Title 49 that gives
either the Board or URS such an obligation. Rather, the obligation was most heavily on
the Hospital and the employees. Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613( 1) (2015). Regardless, as
stated, the claims on appeal are those of the Employees against the Hospital. Because

Ci

URS' claims have been dismissed from the administrative action, and no claims against
URS were ever brought, the Employees cannot now manufacture new claims against
URS.
B.

The Discovery Rule Found in the Governmental Immunity Act Does Not
Apply to the Employees' Claims.

The Hearing Officer correctly applied the common law equitable discovery rule.
Ci}

Any attempt to use a different discovery rule is incorrect. Yet, the Employees argue, as a
policy matter, that this Court should apply a discovery rule like the discovery rule found
in Utah's Govennental Immunity Act ("GIA"). See Br. of Appellants, at 21-23 ("Given

il

the close and overlapping relationship between the discovery rule briefed and decided by
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the USRB hearing officer and the statutory discovery rule outlined in U.C.A. § 63G-7401(l)(b)(i), it is proper for this Court to evaluate whether Ramsay and Smalling knew,
or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the existence of facts to
justify a claim against KCH under the GIA and to have the results of that evaluation
guide the application of the discovery rule in this matter."). However, for the following
reasons, the statutory discovery rule found in the GIA at Utah Code section 630-7401 ( 1)(b) does not govern this action.
First, the claims brought by URS and the Employees fall squarely within the
jurisdiction of the Board as arising under the Act. The Legislature included within the
Act a mandatory administrative appeals procedure for "a person" who has "any dispute
regarding a benefit, right, obligation, or employment right under this title." Id. § 49-11613(l)(c) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has previously determined that all
of the Employees' claims are subject to the Act's mandatory administrative appeals
period. See Ramsay v. Kane County, 2014 UT 5, 118, 322 P.3d 1163 ("[W]e conclude
that all of Plaintiffs' claims fall within the scope of the Act ...."). As such, the process
for bringing and adjudicating the claims involved in this action is laid out in the Act, not
the GIA. As a policy matter, this was a decision made by the Utah Legislature, and any
change would properly be made by legislative action.
Second, because the Act does not contain its own statute of limitations, 5 the
Parties agree, R. 275, 335-36, 375, the Hearing Officer correctly determined, and the

5 Of note,

the 2016 Utah Legislature is considering a bill that would put a statute of
limitations in the Act that, if passed, would govern future claims arising under the Act.
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Board approved, that the general three-year statute oflimitation "for a liability created by
the statutes of this state" applies to this action. Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-305(4); see also
Citibank, N.A. v. S. Dakota Dep't ofRevenue, 868 N.W.2d 381, 391 (S.D. 2015) (holding

that a more specific statute of limitation will apply to "a statute that does not provide a
<i

limitation period, but merely addresses other procedural aspects"). This general threeyear statute of limitation does not include a discovery rule, so under the analysis outlined
in Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, the applicable rule is the equitable
discovery rule. 2005 UT 14, ,r 24, 108 P.3d 741 ("[W]e hereinafter refer to the discovery
rule as it applies to a statute of limitations that does not contain a statutory discovery rule
as an 'equitable discovery rule."'). URS makes no argument regarding the applicability
of the equitable discovery rule to the Employees' claims against the Hospital.
In sum, prior to the ruling of the Hearing Officer, URS always believed that the

i)

equitable discovery rule would toll its claims against participating employers for past
contributions and acted accordingly. Once the Hearing Officer had ruled, URS did not
appeal the Hearing Officer's decision regarding its claims against the Hospital, and the
issue of the application of the statute of limitations to URS' claims is not on appeal.
Because URS' claims have been dismissed, the sole issue on appeal is the application of
the equitable discovery rule to the Employees' claims against the Hospital. With regard
to those claims, the Hearing Officer correctly determined, and the Board approved, that

See H.B. 35, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016), available at http://le.utah.gov/~2016/
bills/static/HB003 5.html.
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the general three-year statute of limitations found in Utah Code section 78B-2-305(4)
applies.

III.

REGARDLESS OF THE APPLICATION OF THE DISCOVERY RULE, NO
SERVICE CREDIT CAN BE AWARDED WITHOUT PAYMENT OF THE
REQUISITE RETIREMENT CONTRIBUTIONS.

As discussed infra, this Court should assume that the Hospital was required to
participate with a retirement system administered by URS upon offering a 401 (k)
retirement plan to its employees. See, e.g., Yeargin, Inc., 2001 UT 11,120. But based
on the holding of the Board's Hearing Officer, the three-year statute of limitations found
in Utah Code section 78B-2-305(4) limits the contributions due by the Hospital to the
three years preceding the filing of URS' Notice of Board Action unless tolled by the
equitable discovery rule. However, regardless of this Court's determination of the
application of the equitable discovery rule, one thing is certain-without the requisite
retirement contributions being paid to URS for additional service credit, URS cannot
grant that service credit nor pay retirement benefits to the Hospital's eligible employees.
The Act provides a defined retirement benefit (referred to as a "pension") based on
"service credit" for the years a public employee works in "regular full-time
employment." See Utah Code Ann.§ 49-13-102(5). The term "service credit" is defined
in the statute as, "the period during which an employee . . . meets the eligibility
requirements for membership in a system ... provided that any required contributions
are paid to the [retirement] office." Utah Code Ann.§ 49-l l-102(48)(a) (emphasis
added); see also id. § 49-13-401 (requiring that an employee have service credit in order
to receive a retirement benefit).
24

The Employees seek both service credit and retirement contributions. In the
Employees' Statement of Claim, attached to their Amended Motion to Intervene, they
seek "to clarify the nature of the relief they seek as Interveners [sic] in this case." R. 523.
They state, "While [URS] seeks from [the Hospital] funding of the retirement benefits
[URS] alleges are owed for [the Hospital's] employees from 1993 through 2009, the
Interveners [sic] seek from [the Hospital] relief that is more specific and targeted to their
own particular circumstances ...." R. 524. Then, to further clarify, the Employees state,
"Specifically, the Interveners [sic] request as relief ... an Order that they are entitled to
service credits under the Act ... and for funding from [the Hospital] as a participating
employer under the Act .... " R. 524. But the Employees cannot receive service credit
without contributions being paid by the Hospital. If URS were required by a court or
other process to provide benefits without contributions, it would create a significant
~

actuarial harm to the Retirement Fund and all participants in the Retirement Systems.
Such an unfunded liability would be borne by the remainder of the participating
employers and employees. In such a case, it would be unjust for the Hospital's
· employees and, collectively, all employees covered by URS, to suffer the additional cost
to their retirement benefits because the Hospital neglected its duty under the Act.
Thus, if this Court determines that the employees are entitled to URS service
credit beyond the nearly three years already granted, for which contributions have already
been paid, this Court must also order the Hospital to pay the requisite retirement
contributions for any additional years.
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CONCLUSION

For purposes of the Hospital's statute of limitations defense and under clear and
mandatory statutory language, the Hospital was required to become a participating
employer with URS as soon as it began offering a 401 (k) retirement benefit to its
employees. Thus, it was required to fund retirement contributions for all its eligible
employees until it opted out of URS in 2009. However, the Hearing Officer correctly
determined that both the three-year statute oflimitations found in Utah Code section
78B-2-305(4) applies to the Employees' claims against the Hospital and that the equitable
discovery rule did not toll the statute of limitations, and the Board approved the Hearing
Officer's determinations. Nevertheless, URS requests that if this Court tolls the statute of
limitations, that it also order that the actuarially required retirement contributions be paid.
-HA-
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